Bobi Wine: Uganda’s Redemption Song?

January 15, 2021

On Thursday, the Ugandan public went to the polls for a critical election that has the chance to usher in new leadership after 34 years of rule by President Yoweri Museveni. Museveni, running for his sixth presidential term since taking power in 1986 is facing off against Bobi Wine, real name, Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, a popular musician-turned-legislator who claims that the Museveni government has subjected himself and his supporters to detention, beatings, and allegedly torture. 

Museveni, who came to power in 1986 at the end of a five-year war that toppled Milton Obote’s repressive rule, has twice orchestrated the removal of constitutional provisions, one that provided for term-limits, and a second, that instituted a 75-year age limit on serving as president.

Election day arrives in a country that has a total U.S. assistance budget exceeding $970 million per year and where the U.S. government plays a role in supporting the professionalization of the military, providing antiretroviral treatment for the nearly 1 million HIV-positive Ugandans, along with working to boost economic growth, improve educational and health outcomes, and support democractic governance. 

However, it is the United States’ support of Uganda’s democratic governance that requires a more focused look, as Bobi Wine’s campaign for president has shone a light on exactly just how far the country has to come in that regard. Further, his candidacy should provide the U.S. an opportunity to reevaluate not only its relationship with Uganda and whether or not it has been truly achieving its goals in the country and how to proceed moving forward.

U.S. Support

Uganda, a key African counterterrorism partner of the U.S., has worked with US forces to defeat al-Shabaab in Somalia through their participation in the AMISOM mission in Somalia, and had previously helped hunt down Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army in the neighboring Central African Republic. However, despite the cheap price tag of only $280 million in military equipment and training between 2011 and 2018 (Uganda has received a far greater share of funds through their AMISOM participation), the Ugandan security forces have been increasingly used by President Museveni to violently suppress protests, arrest political opponents, and even torture. The United States has continued support for Museveni despite these issues, as well his insistence of a loyal judiciary over one that ensures fairness, rampant corruption in the civil service and government, and repeated, unfair elections where there was evidence of extensive vote-rigging that benefitted Museveni.

2021 Ugandan Elections

More recently, during the 2021 presidential campaign, Museveni has doubled-down on his repressive tendencies. He is able to indulge those tendencies due to his total control over the police, the military, and the Electoral Commision, all of which gives Museveni’s National Resistance Movement Party an unfair competitive advantage over opposition party challengers. Indeed, as it has in past elections, the state-owned Uganda Broadcasting Corporation has denied opposition candidate Patrick Amuriat Oboi access to several radio stations where he had booked appearances, as the stations claim that the government threatened to revoke their broadcast license. Additionally, up until March of this year, the government employed what they call the Public Order Management Act, which gave the police sweeping powers to prohibit public gatherings and protests. The law, implemented in 2013, enabled the police to prohibit and violently disperse rallies organized by opposition politicians in previous elections, and even was used to block meetings and concerts organized by Bobi Wine in the past six months. While the Act was repealed in late March, it does nothing to limit Museveni’s control over the police and the army, who continue to do his bidding. In reality, just as the Public Order Management Act was repealed by the Court, the coronavirus pandemic hit Uganda and gave the Museveni government yet another tool to suppress his opposition in the run-up to the January, 2021 elections. 

On March 31, the Ugandan government imposed a strict lockdown, related to the virus, which left many in the country unable to work. After President Museveni threatened to arrest opposition parliamentarians who were distributing food, while allowing politicians from his own party to continue passing out food, it became clear that the government was simply using the lockdown measures as another political tool to burnish the party’s image amongst the population. 

More recently, on November 18, Wine states that when security forces detained him on unspecified charges, his supporters took to the street in protest, during which security forces responded by killing 54 demonstrators and bystanders, including at least one child. Wine has subsequently filed a complaint with the International Criminal Court, claiming that the protestors were killed under “shoot to kill” order issued by Security Minister Elly Tumwine sometime after November 18th, 2020. Moreover, during the live-streamed press conference announcing the complaint, Wine was aggressively dragged out of his vehicle by security service officers, and even when let back into his vehicle, officers drove alongside his team, launching tear gas at protestors. 

Election Problems in Uganda

One of the most disturbing developments in the run up to the Ugandan election was the decision, announced by the Museveni-controlled Electoral Commission to deny more than 75 percent of U.S. election observer accreditation requests, approving the accreditation of only 15 individuals for the entire country. This is despite several requests from the Ambassador, Natalie E. Brown, for an explanation for the decision. 

The lack of U.S. observers is bad enough, but it comes on top of a November 2020 announcement that the European Union would not deploy observers for the election, citing a 2018 EU report that stated that the EU Election Follow-up Mission that deployed to Uganda in March 2018 to measure progress in implementing electoral reforms recommended by the EU Election Observation mission two years prior. The Mission found that there was “limited political will and very limited progress in reforms…” These reforms were to encompass, amongst other things, eliminating the use of excessive force by the armed forces and a requirement for more transparency in vote tallying. 

Another form of unacceptable behavior from the Museveni regime has been the removal from the country of civil society groups working to strengthen democratic institutions. In November, the heads of the United States based National Democratic Institute as well as the head of election programs at the European sponsored Democratic Governance Facility were both deported from the country or, in the case of Lara Petrivevic, Director of the International Republican Institute, otherwise informed that they would no longer be able to return. There is speculation in the country that these individuals were removed from the country due to a belief from the government that they had been providing support to Bobi Wine’s candidacy, citing a musical performance made by Wine during a virtual International Republican Institute event honoring U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. 

Yet another concerning development in the lead-up to the election that demonstrates the crackdown by the Museveni government on the civic space in Uganda is allegations by U.S. Ambassador Brown that the government blocked access to “the bank accounts of several reputable and well-known CSO (civil society organizations), on questionable bases, preventing their important work on voter education, domestic election observation, public dialogues, and tracking and preventing election-related violence.” The lack of access to their accounts has limited the ability of these groups to contribute to peaceful, transparent elections.

Finally, the most recent concerning development that occurred before voting began was on January 12, Mr. Museveni made a televised address where he said that he instructed his government to close access to Facebook, along with access to other social media outlets. This comes after Facebook had only days earlier shut down a network of accounts linked to Uganda’s Ministry of Information, with the company claiming that the network used fake accounts to promote the NRM party and the president. The government claims that this action is unfair, claiming that Facebook was being wrongly used by members of the Wine-led opposition National Unity Platform, and that the government’s accounts were shut down without any due process. However, in a statement, a Facebook representative stated that the network “used fake and duplicate accounts to manage pages, comment on other people’s content, impersonate users, re-share posts in groups to make them appear more popular than they were.” Facebook’s investigation was launched after the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab discovered the pro-government network during an analysis of pre-election activity that showed a collection of Twitter accounts and Facebook pages that engaged in suspicious behavior. In addition to blocking Facebook and Twitter access, the country also moved to block more than 100 virtual private networks (VPNs), which would enable users to circumvent the governmental censorship. All of this comes on the heels of the Museveni government blocking the internet during the 2016 elections and in late 2018, introduced a social media tax on those that wish to use over 60 social media platforms including Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter. The goal of the tax, the government claims, was to tame “idle gossip”, but in reality has been used to stifle speech and access to information. 

United States Reaction

None of this behavior has gone unnoticed in U.S. foreign policy circles, with the expected Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez introducing a resolution on December 17th, calling on the Ugandan government to improve the pre-election environment and create conditions for credible democratic elections. This was followed on December 31st by a strongly worded statement by the Senator, condemning the arrest of Wine, and calling on the Ugandan government to cease its harassment of his presidential campaign. The statement went on to claim that no national poll in Uganda has met international standards for free and fair elections since 1996, the first under President Museveni’s rule. The statement ended by stating that if the elections are not deemed to reflect the will of the people, Senator Menendez will call for the Biden Administration to re-evaluate the U.S. relationship with the Museveni administration, and that he will pursue binding legislation that builds on the December 17th resolution when Congress reconvenes. While this did not seem to have a meaningful impact on the Ugandan government in the days leading up to the election, Museveni may find himself in an exceptionally delicate position going forward if he does manage to cling to power.

Moving Forward

If Bobi Wine does manage to unseat Mr. Museveni, the United States will need to seriously reevaluate its relationship with the country and how US foreign assistance to the country is allocated, both in terms of where the money goes as well as the amount given. 

As it is, the Fiscal Year 2016-2021 Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Uganda, assembled by the World Bank, outlines the essential economic problems faced by the country, that governance challenges, high population growth, weak public service delivery, and low productivity in the agricultural sector, which employs the bulk of its workforce, and the report states that “the country’s political economy dynamics do not, in some cases, offer sufficient incentives to decision makers to implement adopted policy reforms.”

Put simply, the election of a Bobi Wine in a country like Uganda is a golden opportunity that should not be missed. While Uganda already is a generous beneficiary of U.S. foreign assistance, receiving funds for the excellent work that the country has done with refugees, as well as being a recipient of large amounts of USAID funds for HIV/AIDS treatment. However, a Wine victory would present the United States with a much greater opportunity to achieve long-term, democratic change in the country. While the United States should absolutely keep funding Uganda’s efforts with refugees, HIV patients, and their contributions to AMISOM, a Wine victory means that the United States should step up their funding to Uganda, providing greater funding for civil society strengthening activity, good governance, and other rule of law, human rights, and civil society sector work. 

As a young leader of an exceptionally youthful country, Wine should be exactly the type of partner the incoming Biden administration should be reaching out to, offering not only monetary support, but also technical expertise from the State Department and USAID. The Biden administration should offer to work hand-in-hand with the new Wine administration, providing advice when needed, money when required, and diplomatic support at all times, provided he is as interested in true democratic reform as he claims to be. 

The next U.S. Ambassador to Uganda must be either a career diplomat with extensive experience in building good governance, or at the very least, a private sector individual with similar experience. Whoever it is, they will have to help partner with the new Ugandan government not only to improve service delivery and professionalization, but they will also need to be ready to provide advice on how to combat disinformation, as a Museveni loss would not mean that the National Resistance Movement will not likely give up their resistance to the further opening of the political space to civil society. 

No matter who is the ultimate choice as Ambassador, and how ambitious the Biden administration feels it can be with Uganda, one lesson that will have to be learned from the U.S. relationship with President Museveni is that aid needs to be given strict conditionality. The United States must make clear that while we desire to work with democratic reformers all over the world, our funding cannot be without strings, and any security sector assistance, even if it is to advance U.S. goals, should come with conditions relating to the country’s good governance and the freedom of its society. According to the Congressional Research Service, “some analysts have questioned whether security assistance to African governments with poor human rights records (e.g., Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Uganda) may strengthen abusive security forces or inhibit U.S. leverage on issues related to democracy and governance.”

Gone are the Cold War days of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” To avoid a situation where the U.S. is providing nearly $1 billion a year to a country like Uganda, whose government has been in a long, slow, back-slide away from true democracy, means that aid must be given only on the condition that it is being spent by leaders that America can be proud of supporting. 

That means being firm in its determinations. Unlike in 2014, when the United States cut aid to Uganda following their imposition of harsh penalties on homsexuality, only to resume it later, the U.S. must persist with penalties when an aid partner regresses in their behavior.

The United States must make clear that when a country makes the decision to reject autocracy and embrace democracy, the United States will be there with both its financial might but also its technical expertise. Only then will the U.S. be able to truly make a difference in countries like Uganda.