June 4, 2021
On May 24, Colonel Assimi Goïta ordered the arrests of Malian President Bah N’daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, who both subsequently resigned while in prison. On Sunday, Mali’s constitutional court declared Goita to be the country’s interim president. These shocking events, coming only months after the previous government of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was similarly deposed by some of these same members of the former National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), illustrates the dangers the country faces when it comes to achieving a democratic transition. Moreover, the troubles in Mali, preceded by events just months earlier in Chad, are illustrative of some of the major problems both the Western and African governments face when it comes to safeguarding democratic transitions in Central and West Africa while simultaneously ensuring that these countries are able to be effective partners in the fight against violent extremism in the Sahel region.
Last week, addressing the situation in Mali, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would not support countries, “where there is no longer democratic legitimacy or transition.” He further went on to say that if Mali turns towards radical Islamism, he would withdraw the approximately 5,000 French troops from the country. This comes after events earlier in the week, when Macron stated in a tweet that the Malian military had carried out an “unacceptable” coup d’etat. In a confirmation of the president’s views, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves Le Drian also condemned the military takeover, stating that, “We demand the liberation of [President Bah N’daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane.”
On Wednesday, these French statements were followed by an announcement by the African Union (AU) that the body had suspended Mali’s membership in light of the coup. It went further and even threatened sanctions if a civilian-led government is not set-up. Additionally, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Mali until February 2022, when the junta announced that they would hand over power to a civilian government. On top of all of that, the African Union, ECOWAS, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the European Union, and the United States all issued a joint communique through the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), condemning the coup, reaffirming support for the transition to resume its course, and stresses that the coup threatens international support for Mali.
Finally, on May 26th, the U.S. State Department issued a statement, saying that the United States was, “suspending security assistance that benefits the Malian Security and Defense Forces that we had continued previously pursuant to available authorities. The United States will also consider targeted measures against political and military leaders who impede Mali’s civilian-led transition to democratic governance.”
However, while all of these calls for Goïta to reconsider and turn over power are much-needed signs of respect for the rule of law and democracy, the sum of actions from the French, the European Union, the African Union, and even the United States has illustrated a fundamental and dangerous double-standard when it comes to the Sahel region, specifically with how they have all seemed to hold Chad and Mali to completely different standards when it comes to their (un)democratic transitions.
European Reactions to Events in Chad vs Mali
On May 30, Macron told French newspaper Le Journal du Dimanche that France would, when it comes to Mali, “not remain alongside a country where there is neither democratic legitimacy nor transition.” However, one only needs to look 1,500 miles to the west, to Chad, to see that this is simply not the case. France, and indeed the entire Western and African multilateral apparatus has continued to seemingly rally around Chad despite the fact that it’s Transitional Military Council (TMC) in is in no way differentiated from the junta in Mali. Furthermore, continuing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the TMC risks turning a blind eye to the unconstitutional transfer of power going on there.
To truly see the double standard as well as why it is so counterproductive to both Western and African goals in the Sahel, it would be wise to look at all of the ways in which bilateral and multilateral engagements seem to favor the junta in Chad, or at the very least do not subject it to the same level of opprobrium as it has Mali.
First, by simply taking a look at the EU’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel—which was approved on April 16, 2021—one can see that Europe is clearly not living up to the goals it has set for itself in regards to the region. The conclusions of the Council of the European Union on the Integrated Strategy outline several concerns that the Council stated it would be monitoring, including, that, in the Sahel, “In this context, and noting the voices raised against violations of human rights, inequalities, corruption and impunity, the EU is concerned about the fragility of the social contract and challenges to the legitimacy of the State, already undermined by its weak presence in several regions.” Furthermore, the document states that, “The EU stands by the countries of the Sahel in their efforts to respond fully to the aspirations of their people and wishes to step up its support by placing greater emphasis on the political dimension, with governance at the heart of its action.” The Council’s conclusions also state that it’s Integrated Strategy will emphasize the, “importance of the ‘civilian and political leap forwards’: a new political and governance pact focusing in particular on short-term stabilisation and long-term prospects for sustainable social, environmental and economic development, above and beyond military involvement.” Finally, the same document states that, “The EU will pay specific political attention to efforts in the areas of governance and the rule of law…It stands ready to support key moments for democracy, including discussions on the social contract, electoral processes, and inclusiveness in political processes and reforms.”
The problem is that, to a large extent, the EU has failed spectacularly in meeting these goals. Just three days after the Council issued its conclusions on the Integrated Strategy in the Sahel, Chad’s Idriss Déby died due to battlefield wounds. A day later, 15 of the country’s generals, including Déby’s son Mahamat, formed a Transitional Military Council in clear violation of the country’s constitution, which dictated that power should have instead gone to the president of Chad’s National Assembly, Haroun Kabadi, a member of Déby’s party who refused the position, possibly because of fear of junta reprisal or simply because he felt that it was an overall losing proposition.
The failure to hand over power to a civilian authority and instead to a military junta naturally led to protests, with demonstrators demanding a return to civilian rule. However, as might have been expected, protests were put down violently, with local NGO’s reporting 9 deaths, 36 injuries, and 12 arrests in late April. Witnesses say that the government security forces used live ammunition at some of the protests which took place in N’Djamena and Moundou. The protests came less than a week after the visit of Emmanual Macron, the most prominent European head-of-state to visit the country after the death of Idriss Déby, where he spoke reverently of the deceased Déby, despite the fact that France and Europe had turned blind eyes towards the rampant corruption and human rights abuses by Déby’s government.
In addition, the lack of response from the European Union to the military takeover has been deafening, as the closest the European Parliament has come to condemning the coup is a little-noted resolution noting its concern and calling on the international community to, “support Chad in its efforts towards democracy.” The death of Idriss Déby and the succession being hijacked by the military was clearly a “key moment for democracy” in Chad, but was met not only with a lack of opprobrium from Europe, but instead, the country was embraced by the French who had the opportunity to take a stand for democracy and transparency, but instead doubled down on their support for the Chadian military. Not only did the French president pay a respectful visit, but France’s foreign minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian stated on French television that, “exceptional circumstances” necessitated the Transitional Military Council, despite never truly outlining what exactly these “exceptional” circumstances were. Le Drian stated that a democratic transition should only occur once, “the security of the country has really been established”; even though the Chadian military has already declared its victory over the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) rebels. If M. Le Drian was instead referring to the work of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, then the people of Chad may be waiting much longer than the 18 months outlined by the junta, as fighting against armed groups in the region has only intensified in the past year, with little sign of peace arriving soon.
Another example of how European organizations have failed to live up to their ideals when it comes to Chad is the April 2020 “Joint declaration of the members of the European Council with the Member States of the G5 Sahel”. The first listed conclusion of that document was that, “…the leaders express their determination to extend and intensify their support for…rule of law and respect for human rights in the Sahel region.” In light of this text, it is hard to argue that showing support for a junta, instead of the rightful handover of power to a civilian government in Chad, is demonstrating true support for the rule of law. This behavior undermines European commitment to the rule of law not just in Chad, but in Mali as well, as Europe’s quiescence on Chad makes it tough to take seriously its reactions to the overthrow in Mali, such as that from EU Council President Charles Michel, who said, “What happened was grave and serious and we are ready to consider necessary measures.”
The lack of swift European action against what many would say is effectively a coup, certainly makes prior European Union pronouncements on how it would behave in the region ring quite hollow. Indeed, the lack of robust response to Chad’s military challenging the rule of law in the country is even more worrying in light of the fact that the European Union just approved the implementation of the new European Peace Facility (EPF). The EPF is a €5 billion, off-budget fund, financed through contributions from EU member states which allows Brussels, for the first time, to finance military training as well as lethal equipment for national armies. As a January report from the International Crisis Group, entitled, “How to Spend It: New EU Funding for African Peace and Security” has stated,
“The EU should also learn the lessons of ad hoc coalitions such as the Multinational Joint Task Force that is fighting Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin or the G5 Sahel Joint Force, both of which have struggled to advance enduring stability, in part, because they lack a political plan to build trust among populations, prevent exacerbation of communal tensions and lay the groundwork for provision of basic services.”
The Crisis Group report’s authors further stated that providing lethal support to these regional militaries is concerning as, “Militaries themselves can become a threat to stability, with the August 2020 military coup in Mali being a case in point.” It is clear from the past two months’ events in Mali and Chad that Europe has not absorbed this lesson.
African Reactions to the Malian Coup
However, it is not merely Europeans who are exhibiting questionable decision making when it comes to events in Chad versus Mali. Specifically, the African Union’s disappointing double standard when it comes to what is currently going on in Mali is particularly egregious and undermines the body’s credibility when it comes to matters of democracy.
Take, for example, the African Union’s foundational “African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance”, which was adopted in January 2007 and was the first legally-binding document adopted by members of the AU. That document states that one of the key objectives of the Charter is to, “Prohibit, reject, and condemn unconstitutional change of government in any Member State as a serious threat to stability, peace, security, and development.” In the case of Mali, the AU has seemingly lived up to this goal, suspending the country from the body and even threatening sanctions on “spoilers of the current transition” if the Malian military does not comply. This stands in stark contrast to how the African Union responded to Chad, where it initially only sent a fact-finding mission to the country. The results of that fact-finding mission was a rather mealy-mouthed condemnation of the change of government from the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC also called on Chad’s military council to keep to their announced 18-month transition period to hold elections. In addition, while the Chadian TMC has named a civilian politician, Albert Pahimi Padacke as prime minister, Padacke is widely seen as an ally of Déby père, and opposition groups further do not recognize the authority of the junta to name a prime minister. Despite this, the PSC’s response tacitly endorsed Padacke despite Chad’s constitution not having provisions for the military to single-handedly name a new Prime Minister.
Another document that shows how the AU is failing to live up to its founding aspirations in Chad is the “Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes of government”, which states that the governments of the Organization of African Unity, the predecessor of the African Union, “[We] express our grave concern about the resurgence of coup d’etat in Africa. We recognize that these developments are a threat to peace and security of the Continent and they constitute a very disturbing trend and a serious setback to the ongoing process of democratization in the Continent.” The signatories further went on to declare that, “We reaffirm that coups are sad and unacceptable developments in our Continent, coming at a time when our people have committed themselves to respect of the rule of law based on people’s will expressed through the ballot and not the bullet.”
Despite these lofty sentiments, the military takeover in Chad has been greeted with a muted response from the African Union. Indeed, there has not been any mention of sanctions when it comes to Chad’s junta. As Paul-Simon Handy and Félicité Djilo at the Institute for Security Studies have said, the reactions from the African Union, specifically from the Peace and Security Council are troubling for a number of reasons. First, “while it calls for a ‘civilian-led transition’, the PSC doesn’t propose a timetable or outline incentives to steer Chad’s new authorities in this direction.” More strikingly, the two authors also state that the lack of a more robust response could, “…indicate the gradual transformation of the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture to a system that protects governments and regimes in the face of real or perceived enemies. The emphasis on the threat posed by armed groups in Chad to justify an unconstitutional political transition suggests that state security is deemed more important than constitutional values.”
This overall tepid African response only serves to embolden military forces on the continent who will look ahead and possibly take away that AU will only truly condemn a military takeover when the military is not a strong enough partner in the fight against violent extremism. Others will feel that if you are a valuable enough partner, the AU might look the other way if the military decides to stand in the way of a democratic transition.
U.S. Reaction
It is not merely European and African actors who have failed to take a stand against the unconstitutional transfer of power in the Sahel. As Robbie Gramer accurately pointed out in his article for Foreign Policy entitled, “Biden Defaults to ‘War on Terror Approach’ to Chad”, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, in her remarks on the death of Idriss Déby merely called for, “an inclusive national dialogue, one in which all sectors of the society have a chance to shape the future of their country…That dialogue should deliver a timely transition to the democratically elected government that the people of Chad deserve.” At no point does she mention the military coup that had taken place in the country. Nor does she address the many allegations of corruption and human rights abuses that took place under the rule of Idriss Déby, instead only remembering him as, “a leader and a partner who dedicated his life to the fight against violent extremism.” Furthermore, in a press briefing the day Déby died, Ned Price, the State Department’s chief spokesperson repeatedly failed to answer questions about whether the appointment of Déby’s son Mahamat was in keeping with the country’s constitution. Instead, Mr. Price focused on efforts by the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Multinational Joint Task Force in combating violent extremists in the region.
This lack of condemnation from two of the more visible members of the Biden foreign policy team stands in stark contrast with the President’s February address to U.S. State Department employees, where he said, “…we must start with diplomacy rooted in America’s most cherished democratic values: defending freedom, championing opportunity, upholding universal rights, respecting the rule of law, and treating every person with dignity.”
The avoidance, by members of the administration’s foreign policy team, of condemnation is striking as it does feel like it would be the very least that the United States could do in this situation. As Kamissa Camara, the former Malian Foreign Minister and current senior visiting expert at the United States Institute of Peace, has said to Foreign Policy magazine, ““It’s very frustrating for human rights defenders, for civil society groups, for political opposition. Because now is their time,” and that, “Now is the unique opportunity for them to change the trajectory of the country and turn to democracy, but yet the international partners are not explicitly or openly supporting them.” Finally, she says that “The U.S. underappreciates the power that its words have on countries in Africa.”
In regards to Mali, contrasting its behavior towards Chad, the United States joined in on a joint UN and AU statement calling for the immediate release of President N’Daw and Prime Minister Ouane. The statement, which says, “The international community rejects in advance any act of coercion, including forced resignations. Furthermore, U.S. State Department Spokesperson Ned Price issued a statement saying that, “The United States strongly condemns the detention of civilian leaders of Mali’s transition government,” and that, “We are now suspending security assistance that benefits the Malian Security and Defense Forces that we had continued previously pursuant to available authorities. The United States will also consider targeted measures against political and military leaders who impede Mali’s civilian-led transition to democratic governance.”
This kind of double standard is not only inexplicable, but highly counterproductive both to the President’s stated foreign policy agenda of bringing back international respect for the rule of law and U.S. goals for stability in the Sahel region. On top of the fact that seemingly ignoring one coup while condemning another is the kind of terrible mixed-messaging that any government should want to avoid in its foreign policy. The tacit approval of the military takeover in Chad merely allows for the type of instability to occur in the country that gives rise to violent extremism in the first place, as an undemocratic transition has the potential to lead to further strife in the country as segments of the population reject military rule.
Downsides of EU, French, AU, and U.S. Reactions to Mali and Chad
The response from the international community when it comes to Mali could not be more different than its reaction towards recent events in Chad. While the Transitional Military Council in Chad did not remove a sitting President or Prime Minister from power as in Mali, the end result is the same: an undemocratic transfer of power to a military junta—in essence, a coup. The lack of robust Western and African responses to events in Chad undermines the entire framework of organizations like the Coalition for the Sahel which seek peace and security in the region. In addition, it violates some of the African Union’s founding principles as well as the stated goals of the Biden administration’s foreign policy vision.
Furthermore, despite international efforts to militarily combat violent extremism in the region, nearly a decade has passed since France, Mali, and Chad began fighting under Operation Serval and conditions are now, if anything, worse than they were in 2013. Underlying this inability to make headway against extremist groups in the region is a fundamental failure by France, the European Union, the African Union, and the United States to address the underlying drivers of the crisis which are lack of economic opportunity and instability. Instead, the focus has been almost entirely on military interventions against extremists and the training and provision of regional armed forces. That training and arming of Mali and Chad by their international partners has at least partially contributed to the coups in the past few months in both countries.
In the past 8 years, the European Union alone has provided $10.3 billion to the region, and despite that, 14.4 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. Further, the training provided to the leaders of the Malian coup by the United States, Germany, and France shows a direct link between Western aid to the region and the unfortunate situation the countries now find themselves in. Finally, as Ena Dion and Emily Cole at the United States Institute of Peace have pointed out, not only has international funding flowed so heavily to the Malian security sector that it undermines the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the public, but, of the $79 million in U.S. foreign development assistance the country received, only 1% went to democracy, rights, and governance with the military receiving the lion’s share.
Dion and Cole point to research that demonstrates how foreign military aid alters the balance of power between the military and civilian governments, resulting in a greater likelihood of a coup occurring. Furthermore, they state that foreign security assistance in Mali has, “encouraged…the government to pursue a security strategy that aligned with donors’ priorities, investing in driving out extremists or stopping illicit trade over protecting the Malian people.”
If Sahelian countries’ international partners wish to truly address the underlying causes of the instability in the region, they will have to do more than have a laser-focus on security sector concerns. Instead of blindly supporting regimes that promise to meet foreign security goals, international governments should instead focus on helping these countries facilitate rapid returns to civilian rule. Any kind of support for military takeovers of civilian governments should be swiftly and demonstrably condemned by all international partners and if democratic transitions are not respected, foreign military aid should not only be immediately suspended, but sanctions should quickly follow.
The coup in Mali should be a wake-up call for those in the West and in Africa that thought that the events in Chad in April and May were isolated and that governments could turn a blind eye towards threats to democratic governance and the rule of law if a nation’s military was important enough to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism goals. Western and African governments must, going forward, realize that their focus on dealing with African nations purely through a security lens is not only inimical to their plans to end the threat of violent extremism, but instead gives rise to the conditions that foster it. Hopefully, Western and African reactions to the Malian coup demonstrates a fundamental shift in thinking from their leaders and not merely a new type of double standard where a coup is only condemned when the country’s military forces are not vital to a counterinsurgency effort. If not, there may be more issues on the horizon for the already troubled region if members of the Chadian junta feel that international condemnation of Mali means that they are free to continue preventing a democratic transition in their country.
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