September 24, 2021
This weekend’s election marks the end of an era in German politics, as Angela Merkel is not seeking re-election to the chancellorship that she has held since 2005. Merkel, who has been regarded as one of the most stalwart custodians of the liberal Western order since she took office, is departing a country still grappling with the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, an economy struggling with questions about its digital infrastructure and dependence on China, and brewing troubles within the NATO Alliance. Coupled with the issues of climate change and increasing geopolitical competition between nations, left unaddressed during her term as chancellor, the next occupant of the Bundeskanzleramt will have their work cut out for them, navigating the complex series of issues that Germany will need to address if it wants to maintain its position as the leader of Europe.
Angela Merkel was truly a trailblazer as Chancellor, being the first woman, the first East German, and the first scientist to hold the position. She not only successfully resolved tensions between the U.S. and Germany over the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but oversaw the European Union’s response to the global financial crisis, and steered Germany through the events of the migration crisis in 2015. However, her chancellorship was not without criticism, as she was behind decisions to end Germany’s reliance on nuclear power, the suspension of military conscription in 2011, and the choice to move forward with the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline—all of which carried consequences for Germany.
Regardless of those criticisms, Merkel has left an indelible mark on Germany and the European Union, and her successor will find it a tough act to follow. However, there are a number of issues that Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) Olaf Scholz, Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union of Bavaria’s (CDU/CSU) Armin Laschet, or the Green’s Annalena Baerbock will have to quickly confront upon taking the reins in Berlin. It will be interesting to see whether any of Merkel’s potential successors will be able to navigate the way forward in a world contending with the continuing rise of China, rising autocracy in European capitals, an increasingly belligerent Russia in Europe’s periphery, and an overall feeling in Europe that its citizens no longer trust Germany to lead the EU in a world of great power competition.
As forcefully argued by Goran Buldioski of the Open Society Foundations and Open Society Initiative for Europe, the outcome of the German election, “will affect the future of the entire continent.” Furthermore, as asserted by Mark Leonard and Jana Puglierin of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), “Germany may be on the cusp of a nationalist turn. The external building blocks of its outward-looking economy and foreign policy are under assault,” and that, “unless the political class finds a new way of engaging with citizens on European policy, the EU’s most populous member state could eventually take a nationalist turn.” Furthermore, in addition to risks that Germany might take a more nationalist path, there are concerns that, overall, the German populace feels that the EU political system is broken, which could lead the country to drift away from its current role as leader of Europe’s democracies. That being the case, it is therefore a prudent idea to take a look at the ways in which the results of this weekend’s election will have a major impact on the role that Germany will play in the future of the European order.
In a 2014 speech at the Munich Security Conference, German Federal President Joachim Gauck argued that, “Germany is globalised more than most countries and thus benefits more than most from an open world order – a world order which allows Germany to reconcile interests with fundamental values. Germany derives its most important foreign policy goal in the 21st century from all of this: preserving this order and system and making them fit for the future … In my opinion, Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.” Today, it is just as important that Germany remain a leading contributor to the European system, not just economically, but in foreign policy as well. As noted by Bastian Giergerich and Maximillian Terhalle, in their paper, “The Munich Consensus and the Purpose of German Power”, “the first half of the twenty-first century will, essentially, settle the question of whether China and Russia can be accommodate into the existing Western liberal order without war,” and that, “the current major-power peace, which has allowed much of the world to prosper, might disintegrate quickly unless influential states focus their diplomatic efforts on preserving it. Deeply anchored in the West, Germany is one of those states.”
The German Election – What Europeans Expect
Recent polling conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations show that, despite what are sometimes categorized as divisive German policies, Europeans tend to see Berlin and Merkel as unifiers of Europe. However, as noted in the ECFR’s research, Merkel was able to position Germany as a balancer between interests, finding compromises on issues like the Greece debt crisis that seemingly no other European politician could reach. What that led to was a popularity that no other European leader could match. Indeed, as the ECFR notes, if an election were to be held between Merkel and France’s Emmanuel Macron for a theoretical “president of the European Union”, Merkel would receive 41% of the vote, compared to just 14% for Macron. These figures are more astounding when looking at the individual country data, with Merkel receiving a majority of the votes in the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, and over 40% in Denmark, Hungary, Germany, and Sweden. Even France, Macron’s own country, has 32% of respondents favoring Merkel, as opposed to just 20% for Macron. Furthermore, ECFR polling shows that European respondents see Germany as a leader of a free Europe, and they trust Germany to stand up for democratic values and principles, even in countries like Hungary and Poland, whose governments are currently under an EU Article 7 sanctions procedure, designed to determine whether their country is at risk of a “serious breach” of EU values.
However, looking under the hood, one sees that not all of Europe is pleased with the state of German policy, nor Merkelism in general. Data compiled by the ECFR shows that only 20-25% of Europeans trust Germany to handle EU relations with the US and Russia, and only 17% trust Germany to lead the Union in its relationship with China. This feeling of skepticism towards German leadership is also prevalent in Germany itself, with 52% of citizens feeling that the country’s golden age is in the past, making it the most pessimistic nation about its future in Europe, outside of Austria. Furthermore, while 29% of Europeans in general trust Germany to lead the European Union on defense and security issues, only 20% of Germans do the same. Furthermore, a full ⅕ of Germans do not trust the country to provide leadership on any issues, including: defense and security; economic and financial issues; relations with China, Russia, and the United States; and democracy and human rights.
Going forward, there is a danger that the pessimism of the German populace will spread to the rest of Europe, imperiling Germany’s position as the EU’s leading power. While most Europeans currently see Germany as a beacon of Western democracy and the rule of law, there are risks that in the post-Merkel world, Germany will have issues combating the breakdown in the rule of law in EU member states such as Hungary or Poland, as well as in uniting Europeans in the new era of geopolitical competition taking place not only in Europe’s periphery, but the Middle East, North Africa, and the Indo-Pacific.
Furthermore, there is a danger that the pessimism of the German people towards the EU will imperil the entire European experiment. Polling conducted in April of this year showed that the percentage of Germans who feel that the EU system is broken has risen to 55%, an 11% leap from 2020, and ⅓ of Germans believe that the pandemic has shown that EU integration has gone to far, up from just 23% the year before. As noted by Thomas Bagger in his piece, “The World According to Germany: Reassessing 1989”, after the end of the Cold War, “Germany was poised to reap a peace dividend and the country lost any perception of threat. The defense budget shrunk to barely above one percent of GDP; conscription was even suspended without any serious debate as recently as 2011 by a conservative defense minister. In short, because of its historical luck of reunification and the end of the division of Europe, Germany had for a generation lost almost any sense that there could be threats emerging not only elsewhere in the world but even against Germany itself,” and that, “the future was in development aid, in conflict mediation, and in speeding up gradual convergence. Military power no longer mattered—civilian power did.”
However, events since Merkel’s elevation to the chancellorship, particularly since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and the resultant spillover of migration, has led to a reassessment in Germany, not just of its foreign policy, but of its place in, and trust of, the European Union. As noted by Leonard and Puglierin, Germany’s domestic rehabilitation and reconstruction after World War II was, “facilitated and legitimated by an international politics of sublimation and integration into alliances. The Germany strategy was to try to avoid being perceived as threatening or dominant. To this end, German leaders framed German interests as ‘European interests.’” While this perceived self-sacrifice has resulted in undeniable economic and geopolitical benefits, the result is a citizenry still facing climate change, a pandemic, and questions about whether and how Europe should pursue a path of “strategic autonomy”.
Going forward, whoever emerges in the German elections this weekend will need to come up with a foreign policy that does not provoke further resentment from the German electorate, all while developing a patriotic case for international engagement, strengthening European sovereignty, and reorienting the German economy towards the digital and green revolutions.
That said, there are a number of external, European, challenges that the next chancellor will have to address, ranging from the currently on-hold Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China; state building in the Balkans; or even rule of law concerns in Hungary and Poland. Some of these issues have pressing time constraints attached, leaving the next chancellor precious little time to decide on how they want Germany to lead on these critical questions.
China and the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment
A key issue that the next German chancellor will have to navigate is the currently held-up Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China. The deal, the language of which was finalized in December of 2020, was allegedly rushed to completion in order to achieve implementation before Biden was sworn in on January 20, and was the result of seven years of negotiations between Brussels and Beijing. However, before the pact could be reviewed and formally ratified by the European Parliament, the United States, EU, UK, and Canada imposed sanctions on Chinese officials allegedly involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Days later, the Chinese responded with sanctions of their own, ultimately jeopardizing the fate of the deal.
The CAI is of critical economic importance because, under Merkel’s stewardship, Germany saw a large increase in investment opportunities in China, as Beijing slowly began the process of opening up China’s economy to foreign competition. For example, in the 3rd quarter of 2020, Germany was the largest European investor in China, with $840 million in completed investments, compared to just $270 million for the Netherlands and $140 million for France. More specifically, German investment was heavily concentrated in the automotive sector, with projects by BMW, Daimler AG, and Volkswagen leading the way. These deals, the boosting of subsidies for electric cars in Germany, and the bailout of the German auto industry as it struggles with the impacts of the pandemic, all demonstrate Merkel’s robust commitment to the German automotive industry. Therefore the CAI’s focus on opening up the Chinese automotive sector to foreign competition can be seen simply as an extension of that previous largesse towards an industry responsible for 5% of German GDP, which desires to achieve greater market share in a country responsible for up to 40% of all sales.
However, the next chancellor will have their work cut out for them if they want to achieve similar results for the German car industry, if they indeed even want to pursue the CAI at all. The SPD and Olaf Scholz, who is the current favorite to win the chancellorship, have already argued that the CAI is “politically dead” and that, “the idea of the [Comprehensive Agreement on Investment] has become outdated. It would have been a great achievement five, seven years ago, but it smells like the old times.” Furthermore, the Green party has expressed its dissatisfaction with the investment covenant previously and has shown a more strident line against China in terms of trade policy. However, Merkel’s chosen successor, the CDU/CSU’s Armin Laschet, has indicated his party’s continued support for the deal, noting that Germany can have separate, parallel talks on human rights and investment with China.
Whoever the next chancellor is, they will have to deal with a German public that largely views China as either a rival or a country with which Germany needs to compete. Furthermore, similar polling shows that 52% of German voters feel that the EU should strongly criticize Chinese violations of human rights and the rule of law, and 71% of Germans have a negative opinion of China. As argued by Janka Oertel at the ECFR, “even if Germans remain interested in defending this status quo, it will be increasingly hard to maintain their current level of prosperity—and security—without charting a new course on China.” Whoever emerges from Sunday’s election will need to walk a fine line between gaining every possible advantage for German industry and a focus on human rights issues.
Hungary, Poland, and the Rule of Law
Another major issue that the next chancellor will have to confront is the continuing erosion of the rule of law in Hungary and Poland. The 2021 rule of law reports compiled by the European Commission on Hungary and Poland documented concerns about ongoing corruption, a lack of independence of the judiciary, and continued erosion of checks and balances in the political systems of both nations. This comes after the European Court of Justice ruling in July of 2021 that the Polish system of judicial discipline is “not compatible with EU law”, and the EU seeking financial penalties until the Polish government comes into compliance with the Court’s ruling. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently stated in her EU State of the Union address, “The Commission attaches the highest importance to the rule of law,” and that, “breaches of the rule of law cannot be tolerated.”
While Merkel has attempted to resolve these issues before she leaves her post, more than likely, the next chancellor will have to be the one to stand up for European values, as under Merkel’s leadership, “Germany was not at the forefront of efforts to protect democracy and the rule of law.” As speculated by the ECFR’s Piotr Buras and Jana Puglierin, “The breakdown of the EU’s fundamental values…could destroy the union, especially if it coincided with the emergence of an authoritarian equilibrium backed by EU funds.” Furthermore, the authors note that, “if post-Merkel Germany wants to protect the European project…it will have to openly lend political support to decisive action against those who attack the foundations of the union. The EU and its member states can only achieve this by abandoning Merkelism.”
Under her leadership, Merkel prized a unified Europe, and according to the former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ana Palacio, “Germany has effectively led Europe’s non-strategy to rein in its illiberal members,” when it comes to rule of law violations. Furthermore, as Palacio argues, once Merkel is gone, “EU leaders will have to start making tough decisions—beginning with what to do about the strongmen both within and beyond its borders.”
Of the three candidates most likely to achieve the chancellorship, Olaf Scholz had previously questioned whether Poland and Hungary would be willing to hold up EU recovery funds linked to rule of law requirements, though that sentiment appears to have been naïve. However, there are hopes that, if chosen to lead a coalition, the SPD or the Greens would take a more hardline approach towards Hungarian and Polish rule of law violations. As German Green MEP Sergey Lagodinsky has stated, when it comes to these violations, “The fact that either the SPD or Greens will be part of the new government will change the dynamics. I think also that the Christian Democrats (CDU) with a new face will be more under pressure to be more active and more clear on that front,” and that, “At least, as representative of the German Green party, I can assure you that us [the Greens] being – hypothetically – part of the new government, we will definitely address this topic in a more assertive way.” Furthermore, the CDU/CSU’s Armin Laschet has also indicated that he will pursue a more aggressive posture towards Hungary and Poland, noting, “We need all 27 member states, also Hungary and Poland, if we want to further develop Europe. At the same time, one needs to insist on the rule of law.” Laschet then went further and stated that, “”Everybody who joined the EU has to accept the position of the European Court of Justice, and if somebody violates European law that will lead to sanctions and consequences, for example, when it comes to the allocation of funds,” which indicates at least a willingness to pursue a more tough position towards the two recalcitrant EU member states. Once again, though, it remains to be seen if the next German chancellor will have the ability to unite the rest of the EU member states around themselves in order to achieve victory in the courts and implement the rule of law mechanism.
While the issues surrounding Hungary and Poland’s slides towards authoritarianism are ones that need to be addressed by the entire EU, Merkel provided cover for Orbán and Duda in an attempt to maintain European solidarity. Whoever succeeds her will need to unwind the mess that she left quickly in order to prevent a further drift from democratic values in Poland and Hungary.
Russia, Ukraine, and Nord Stream 2
The next major European issue that the next German chancellor will have to confront is Russia and the final approvals required for the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The pipeline, when combined with its predecessor, Nord Stream, is capable of delivering over 110 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year along its roughly 1,200 kilometer distance between St. Petersburg and the northern German coast, was a major project for Merkel, who was dealing with the price tag accompanying Germany’s green transition and Germany’s pivot away from nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster.
As the SPD’s Olaf Scholz has argued, “Electricity has to become cheaper in Germany. Because our companies must be able to survive in international competition,” and that, “my goal is an industrial electricity price of four cents.” However, Scholz has warned that, if Moscow were to not abide by the terms of the deal struck between the Kremlin and Berlin, the pipeline could be cut off, “just like that”. Similarly, the CDU/CSU’s Armin Laschet has warned that Putin must, “play by the rules”, in order for the pipeline to remain operational.
Completion of the pipeline carries with it not only serious implications for the future of European energy security, but it would also have a dramatic impact on both the economic and security situations in Ukraine, giving Russia further leverage over Kyiv. If the pipeline were to be completed, Ukraine, which currently makes around $1 billion per year on the transit of Russian gas through its territory, would have less leverage over other European nations, forcing it to possibly become more dependent on Russia.
While Scholz has argued that Russia must abide by the terms of its deal with Ukraine, the U.S., and Germany, his SPD party has a history of being soft on Russia. In particular, former SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has argued that Russia’s approach to the annexation of Crimea is, “completely understandable” and former SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder is not only chairman of the board for the Russian, state-owned, oil company Rosneft, but the Nord Stream 2 consortium.
In regards to Laschet’s CDU/CSU, the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Jeffrey Mankoff notes that, “the influence of big business within Merkel’s center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has limited the center-right’s appetite for a confrontational approach to Moscow…” Furthermore, the German newspaper Die Welt, lists Laschet as one of the Germans, along with Schröder, who “understands Russia and Putin”. In addition, like Scholz, Laschet has said that, “40 percent of the gas that we need for our modern gas-fired power plants so that the energy transition can succeed comes from Russia,” making it highly unlikely that he will want to upset the already tense relationship with the Putin regime.
However, the Green’s Annalena Baerbock views the Germany-Russia relationship differently, stating that Germany should be, “increasing the pressure on Russia”, over Russia’s military buildup on the Ukrainian border this past spring. Furthermore, Baerbock has said that German political support for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline should be “withdrawn”, as it weakens European and German energy security. As submitted by Henryka Moscicka-Dendys, the former Polish ambassador to Denmark, “if the Greens are involved in the negotiations to form the next German government, [Nord Stream 2] will be one of the most important climate and energy issues they will need to address. It touches on the core of Germany’s green transition.”
Once again, whoever wins the election on Sunday will have difficult choices to make both when it comes to the future of Germany’s green transition, as well as the geopolitical and economic fate of Ukraine.
German Defense and Security Policy
In terms of defense policy, the next German chancellor will have a number of issues to confront, ranging from the role of the Bundeswehr and the creation of a European Army; the future of the FCAS 5th-generation fighter aircraft; and the fate of U.S. nuclear weapons positioned on German soil.
As has been noted, Germany has not quite met the promise of the “Munich Consensus” of 2014, wherein the German president, foreign minister, and defense minister announced that the country would take on more responsibility in international security affairs. However, this relative malaise has been fairly justifiable, driven by the sentiment of the German public, the majority of which is for remaining neutral in Germany’s foreign policy. In light of this fact, it is therefore worth noting that the major German political parties’ manifestos all support greater funding for the Bundeswehr. However, as noted by the ECFR, only Laschet’s CDU/CSU supports the NATO goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense, whereas the Greens platform criticizes the 2% formulation.
As far as a European army goes, the SPD and CDU/CSU both support the creation of a European Defense Union and a European armed forces, and the Greens under Annalena Baerbock have also voiced their support for taking steps towards the creation of a European army, though with “strong parliamentarian control and a common, restrictive arms export controls” placed on a future European Defense Union. The Greens’ election manifesto also opposes the European Defense Fund, stating that the party rejects, “the reallocation of funds from the EU budget previously earmarked exclusively for civilian purposes for military purposes.”
As for nuclear weapons, it has been noted in the past that Germany under Merkel, “remains reluctant to discuss nuclear weapons in a wider security context, and this is turning into a risk for Europe.” However, the issue remains an important one going forward particularly in the context of Germany’s plans to replace its aging Tornado fighters. As has been previously claimed, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), under joint Franco-German-Spanish development, carries with it implications regarding the fate of Germany’s nuclear sharing agreement with NATO, particularly in light of Russia’s violations of the former INF Treaty and its deployment of IRBMs in the Western part of the country. Germany, which currently employs the nuclear-capable Tornado fighter, is in the process of replacing the aircraft, but while it contemplates the transition, it faces calls from the Green party to join the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Furthermore, SPD parliamentary group leader Rolf Mützenich has argued that, “nuclear weapons on German territory do not heighten our security, just the opposite,” and that, “the time has come for Germany to rule out future stationing.” However, a 2018 coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD states that, “As long as nuclear weapons play a role as a deterrent instrument in NATO’s strategic concept, Germany has an interest in participating in the strategic discussions and planning processes. Successful disarmament talks create the conditions for the withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Germany and Europe.” Nevertheless, as noted by Steven Pifer of the Brookings Institution, “The CDU/CSU is strongly committed to maintaining nuclear sharing, described by one CDU Bundestag member as ‘an essential part of the German security architecture.’”
Ultimately, what this means is that the next German chancellor will be able to have an impact on not just the security architecture of the German nation, but that of the entire European Union. While it is unlikely that, even under a Green chancellorship, Germany would go as far as signing the TPNW, it would be a major step to have a German chancellor that questioned the safety provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. No matter what the outcome, the next chancellor will have a major impact on the future of German defense and security policy.
The Transatlantic Relationship
One final area in which the next German chancellor will have to make important decisions is in regards to the transatlantic alliance with the United States. After four years of Trump exacerbating tensions in the relationship between the U.S. and Europe, France’s Macron had complained that the NATO Alliance was “brain-dead” and that Europe must instead pursue its own “strategic autonomy”, without the need or requirement to rely on the U.S. This led many to argue that the next few years under the Biden administration represented a possible last chance for the transatlantic partnership, as the U.S. President reached out to Merkel in an attempt to revitalize the relationship, and Merkel herself stressed the need to maintain the relationship.
The relationship between the next German chancellor and the U.S. President will have vital importance not just for security policy, but for issues like climate change, technology regulation, and on the fate of the Iran nuclear deal.
The CDU/CSU’s Armin Laschet has stated that, on the military front, “cooperation with the U.S. in NATO will remain existential.” To that end, he argues that, “Germany needs to make a greater contribution, both financially and militarily and we have to strengthen the European pillar.” This position by Laschet aligns fairly well with German public sentiment on which issues that Germany should partner with the United States on. For instance, while only 12% of Germans feel that the U.S. is a good partner on protecting the environment, a majority say that the U.S. is a partner on protecting European security.
The SPD’s Olaf Scholz has said of the alliance, that, “we need a strong and stable European Union side by side with a powerful but principled United States of America,” and that, when it comes to dealing with China, “Europe and the US need to engage constructively with China – ideally, in a coordinated manner as transatlantic partners. We must safeguard fair trade practices and fair competition in order to defend a level playing field. “ Though, while 60% of Americans view Germany as a key partner in dealing with China, only 28% of Germans feel the same about the U.S. However, the U.S. presidential election may have shifted some Germans’ feelings towards the U.S., as 23% of Germans in November of 2020 viewed the U.S. as a preeminent foreign policy partner, compared to just 10% in September of the same year. While that does not mean that progress on the China file would be easy, it does show that there is room for progress to be made.
Finally, the Green party’s Annalena Baerbock co-wrote an op-ed, in which she argued that there is a chance for a new beginning between Germany and the United States, starting with transatlantic efforts to reform the WHO and cooperation on the production of medical equipment and vaccines; a transatlantic alliance for climate neutrality; a digital corporation tax and rules and standards that protect innovation and competition; a joint agenda for robust democracies, including Biden’s proposed Summit of Democracies; an initiative for green investment at the WTO; and a new, broader concept of burden sharing in NATO.
While all three candidates have strong views about how to reinvigorate the transatlantic alliance, whoever is elected will have a lot of work to do to reach a middle ground on all of these issues, especially on digital taxes and standards regulating tech companies.
Final Thoughts
The aforementioned issues are not even the only ones that the next German chancellor will have to confront, merely the most pressing ones that require the most difficult choices. Other issues that remain to be addressed include the impact of climate change on the world as a whole and Germany specifically, state building challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, and the future of Afghanistan, to name just a few.
A key challenge for whomever emerges as the likely head of a coalition will be to convince Germans that there is a need to shift gears away from years of confrontation avoidance under Angela Merkel. While history will likely be kind to Merkel’s economic legacy, her foreign policy and defense footprint may not be quite as well received by future historians. The next German chancellor, therefore, faces a number of challenges in foreign policy and defense, and will need to navigate a revisionist Russia, rising China, and a United States that is somewhat reluctant to engage in European security. It will be important for that next individual to reverse the hands-off policy that Angela Merkel had taken towards many of the issues facing Germany and the EU, whether it is Russian aggression towards Ukraine or democratic backsliding in Hungary.
After the election of Donald Trump, Angela Merkel had been referred to as the new “leader of the free world”, and as Europe’s biggest economy, meaning that whoever succeeds her will, invariably, be called upon to serve as one of the key leaders of the European Union. While the United States may have returned to a position of leadership, Germany will have a vital role to play in the remainder of the 21st century. Whoever emerges victorious will need to hit the ground running and begin to address the numerous issues that have seemingly fallen by the wayside under Merkel’s leadership. From China and climate to Nord Stream and nuclear sharing, the next chancellor will need to make the right choices not only as the leader of Germany, but as one of the paramount leaders of the entire European Union.
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