March 4, 2022
Author’s Note: Due to some out-of-state travel this week, today’s post will not be the usual analysis of a timely topic; though normal service will resume next week. Instead, due to time constraints, I thought that I would take the chance to look at some of the articles, commentaries, and papers that I have not been able to dive into deeply over the past few months, and talk a bit about why I found each to be interesting (and you might too). In addition to reading my brief synopsis, I highly recommend looking at each briefing/paper/report in its entirety. Let’s take a look, together!
First up is a January 19 briefing from the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Anthony Cordesman, “The Middle East and North Africa in International Relations: The Changing Dynamics of Regional and National Security.” The briefing aims to give an overview of the shifts in MENA security dynamics since the “Arab Spring” in the early part of the last decade, and looks at some of the region-wide challenges, which include: poor governance, ethnic/sectarian challenges, over-dependence on oil exports, arms racing, rising major power and outside state competition, and a focus on fighting violent extremism with limited attention being paid to its underlying causes. As ever, Cordesman provides an honest, clear-eyed review of the situation, noting how poorly many of the countries perform in terms of effective governance, corruption. Further, he notes how differing economic and demographic growth rates all combine to create major problems in civil development and hinder countries’ ability to create internal stability. What’s more, Cordesman gives an overview of the region’s changing military dynamics, which will likely alter the nature of regional conflict, as continuing hydrocarbon exports allow regional countries to radically advance their arsenals, complicating the region’s strategic picture moving forward.
Another interesting article that may have gone under the radar in the past few months is a piece from Anouar Boukhars of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Trajectories of Violence Against Civilians by Africa’s Militant Islamist Groups.” The article, which focuses on the increasing number of Islamist-linked attacks on civilians in Africa, argues that, in order to protect civilians, one must first understand the underlying patterns of the violence to be able to see why attacks are occurring in the first place.
To begin, Boukhars notes that attacks on civilians tend to occur in multi-actor environments with high out-group antagonism and ongoing socioeconomic divisions. Further, a group’s leadership’s inability to control their own fighters’ behavior is a strong indicator of potential attacks on civilians. The author proceeds to look at civilian attacks in the Sahel, Somalia, and Mozambique, noting that while the underlying circumstances in each area are different, all three have seen massive upticks in violence against civilians in recent years. In the Sahel, where 42% of violent attacks targeted civilians in 2021, intercommunal tensions, combined with clashes between the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel and the Macina Liberation Front, have increased the number of civilian deaths in recent years. Furthermore, security forces’ over-reliance on community based self-defense groups, which lack robust oversight, has ended up aggravating communal tensions and triggering more deadly civilian violence. In Somalia, al-Shabaab’s resilience has enabled the group to evolve and thrive financially, allowing it to continue its campaigns of suicide bombings and IED attacks throughout Mogadishu and the rest of the country. Finally, in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, Boukhars notes that Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama’a (ASWJ) violence is mainly rooted in outgroup antagonism towards the dominant Makonde ethnic business elites and officials, along with the heavy handed security responses from the FRELIMO government, and that security forces’ brutality in their response has only increased ASWJ recruitment. While South African mercenaries have helped stabilize the situation somewhat, they have been accused of war crimes, further straining the relationship between locals and the government in Maputo.
Moving forward, Boukhars argues that a reassessment is needed and that the key to such an effort is to prevent militants from exploiting already simmering intercommunal and ethnic tensions. Further, the authors argues that in Cabo Delgado, as the FRELIMO government has long been seen as exploiting the area’s resources—to little local benefit—an independent body may need to be set up to facilitate inter communal dialogue, strengthen dispute resolution mechanisms, and establish more equitable land use and property rights rules. Boukhars states that not only does the government need to focus on better providing basic social services in the Cabo Delgado area, it needs to train the country’s security forces to avoid heavy handed responses which will only further antagonize these communities. Without that, Mozambique will be unable to break the cycle that contributes to militant violence against civilians.
Related to the Africa Center piece is a February 10 briefing from the International Crisis Group (Crisis Group), “Winning Peace in Mozambique’s Embattled North,” which examines the way in which Mozambique’s partners should press the government to do more to end the conflict, preventing it from spiraling out of control. The authors note that while outside donors have funded an aid surge, no amount of aid is likely to resolve the underlying problems in Cabo Delgado. This is because, in Cabo Delgado, locals’ grievances are rooted in a desire to more greatly benefit from the extraction of their region’s rich natural resources. However, historically, Maputo has kept such riches for itself and failed to address issues of corruption, human rights violations, and displacement that drives locals to join violent extremist organizations.
The report also notes that while the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) has deployed troops as part of the Southern African Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), and al-Shabaab numbers have dwindled, SAMIM sources say that core leadership of al-Shabaab have remained in Quirimbas national park, maintaining regular raids and attacks, and keeping the security situation in Cabo Delgado fragile. Furthermore, ongoing violence has left over 750,000 locals uprooted, with most packed into displacement camps in the southern part of Cabo Delgado. Compounding civilians’ misery are shakedowns from Mozambican troops as well as the struggle to reintegrate women and girls held captive by insurgents.
The Crisis Group report also notes that despite military pressure from SAMIM, as well as South African and Rwandan fighters, insurgents have survived and adapted, utilizing training from the Islamic State to create better bombs, and opening up a new front in Niassa province to the west of Cabo Delgado. There, the insurgents take advantage of local food, water, and hunting reserves to build a new power center, crossing the Rovuma river for more attacks and stretching security forces rather thin.
Ultimately, the Crisis Group authors argue that some form of political engagement is going to be needed in order to end the conflict, as insurgents resent FRELIMO’s monopolization of the economy in Cabo Delgado as well as security force abuses. To arrive at a peaceful solution, the authors suggest that Maputo’s African partners push for: dialogue involving any political elites with influence in Cabo Delgado; the vetting of former fighters and involving them in security arrangements for the province once the military campaign is over; and an amnesty for low-level fighters and demobilization/reintegration camps to reincorporate those low-level fighters back into society. However, the authors are clear that dialogue will not be enough and that Maputo and its partners also need to dismantle the financial, recruitment, and IED proliferation cells linked to ISIS in East Africa, because as outside groups like ISIS continue to channel funds and expertise into the region, peace becomes that much harder to achieve. Finally, in terms of international pressure, while the EU may be able to dip into the European Peace Facility to help fund efforts to combat violent extremists in Cabo Delgado, Europe is unlikely to want to foot the entire bill, meaning that the African Union will need to help the SADC raise funds if it wants to continue the SAMIM deployment.
The last piece on the problems in Mozambique was a short, but interesting, piece by Liesl Louw-Vaudran from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Her piece, “Lessons for Mozambique after France’s withdrawal from the Sahel,” questions the ability of multinational troop interventions to achieve a lasting peace in Mozambique, as even three thousand troops on the ground are insufficient to address the roots of the crisis. In addition to continuing high unemployment and poverty in Cabo Delgado, there is the fact that there is rampant infighting among ruling elites over lucrative natural resource deals. To resolve the issue will require more equitable access to the natural resource wealth of the region, and a commitment from the country’s political elite to stabilize the northern part of the country. Furthermore, Louw-Vaudran states that there exists little cohesion and coordination between multilateral organizations, which creates an overall lack of synergy in the response. What results is a tendency towards military deployments to address the violence, rather than attempts to address the root causes of conflict. As France’s failures in Mali have shown, a militarized response is not sufficient to fix Mozambique’s underlying problems such as economic inequality, poor service delivery, and government corruption, which plague Cabo Delgado. Left unaddressed, no amount of regional troop deployments will resolve the situation.
Somewhat related to the ISS piece is a February policy report from the Atlantic Council, “Sahel: Moving Beyond Military Containment,” by Pierre Englebert and Rida Lyammouri, which examines the region’s ongoing crisis, along with recommendations for both regional states and international donors to help escape the conflict. The crisis, which began in the wake of the Libyan civil war, has expanded to include numerous violent extremist organizations active in Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, and has no end in sight. In fact, the situation is actually deteriorating, as both local and international Islamic groups (AQIM, ISGS, ISWAP, JNIM, Katiba Macina) attack communities, government forces, and each other.
In addition to the proliferation of violent extremist organizations (VEOs), there has been an expansion in the number of local self-defense groups and ethnic militias in the region, further exacerbating underlying tensions. For instance, in the Mopti region, home to 1.6 million Malians, recurring and worsening droughts have served to amplify tensions between local Fulani cattle herders and Dogon farmers, and the outbreak of jihadist violence in 2015 prompted these communities to establish their own self-defense militias, kicking off a cycle of intercommunal violence that continues to this day. Further complicating the situation are the traffickers smuggling cigarettes, hashish, and cocaine along with migrants through the region, which leads to the creation of mafia-like structures which challenge previously established authorities within the region and provide a tempting career for the large number of regional youths who lack gainful employment. Making matters worse is ongoing violence committed by state security forces which merely serve to exacerbate the underlying drivers of conflict for local civilians.
What’s more, the Atlantic Council authors outline how foreign interventions, specifically France’s Operation Barkhane, not only failed to address the root causes of violence, but may have exacerbated the problem through alleged human rights violations and an overall lack of accountability from Paris. Furthermore, Englebert and Lyammouri argue that France’s ongoing inability to conceive of the situation through anything but a military lens has hindered its ability to make real change in the region. For instance, while the 2021 Pau Summit emphasized the return of the state and governance to the Sahel, governance issues were merely an afterthought, with the fight against terrorism listed as the primary objectives, and provision of services, justice, and development mere afterthoughts.
Furthermore, advocates of a militarized strategy are unable to directly point to how the threat will be vanquished, other than by naming individuals and groups that the military must target for defeat. This has led some, like Nigerien President Mohammed Bazoum to label Barkhane a “relative failure” and state that even a partial French retreat would have a minimal impact on the counterterrorism mission. Meanwhile, the French argue that the violence that has spread along ethnic and communal lines is outside the remit of Barkhane, which, as Englebert and Lyammouri state, ignores how such dynamics are what allow for the emergence of violent extremist organizations in the first place. Compounding these struggles are the failures of Sahelian governments to curb corruption, provide security in government-held territory, and reform their security sectors.
Ultimately, what the Atlantic Council report suggests is that Sahelian states need to do much more if they want to create opportunities for good governance at home. The first recommendation the authors make it to better empower local communities to make their own rules. West African history shows that modern, Western democratic structures are a poor fit for regional circumstances, and that a more federal system, such as existed in the Songhai Empire in the 13th-17th centuries, would be a better fit. Such federal systems would recognize that sovereignty belongs to local communities, and not the post-colonial states that were set up in the dissolution of empire. Empowering local communities would not only enable them to better administer their own resources, it would allow the federal state to focus on a more manageable array of functions, such as the provision of security. Another recommendation made by the authors is that Sahelian states should build upon local populations’ desires to be governed by religious laws, not to create a repressive theocracy, but to give a greater role for Islamic associations in the region. States could also build upon Islam’s political legacy in West Africa in order to provide a more conducive environment for governance.
When it comes to military assistance to the region, the Atlantic Council report argues that civilian protection must be the watchword for all operations, and that outside providers of security sector assistance—such as the US and European Union—need to rethink the ways in which they provide it. When U.S. drone intelligence facilitates a French focus on killing jihadists, it frequently ends up only producing more local grievances. Englebert and Lyanmmouri also outline two alternatives to the current ways of conducting military assistance: direct, targeted interventions against violent extremists that are part of broader multinational coalitions; and security-focused support limited to cross-national, integrated military collaborations to incentivize federal-like operations over reinforcement of militias that often pray on civilians.
Finally, the Atlantic Council piece closes with an argument that official development assistance needs to better address the root causes of regional fragility, addressing the intercommunal tensions that create openings for violent extremists to exploit. Since good governance requires the state to be reconciled with local populations that often possess deep distrust of the government, donors can help through the provision of services—by any willing and accountable actors—as an alternative to governance by violent actors. As part of this, the authors suggest that the Sahel’s international partners should support the development of community-based and -led committees for reporting human rights abuse by all parties. Further, they argue that France should specifically engage with partners to determine what kind of intercommunal healing must occur to address the violence done under the name of Operation Barkhane as well as address the ongoing climate and energy issues that so dramatically affect the region.
Next up is another piece from Anthony Cordesman, with the assistance of Grace Hwang, “NATO and Ukraine: Reshaping NATO to Meet the Russian and Chinese Challenge.” The report, from February 16, looks at the ways in which NATO can be improved in order to remedy the Alliance’s troubling lack of modernization, interoperability, and leadership. Cordesman makes clear that a myopic focus on NATO members’ spending levels, as occurred during the Trump administration, is merely a distraction from a concentration on more effective and interoperable national military forces.
Cordesman’s report notes that while European members of NATO have spent between four and five times what Russia spent on defense since the end of the Cold War, they have not gotten enough capability in return for their spending. For instance, Cordesman notes more needs to be done in Brussels to develop clear national plans to improve the military forces of individual European nations, while also doing more to improve interoperability. After all, the author notes, while Europe has made major cuts to force size since the end of the Cold War, Russia has as well. However, Europe faces the problem of coordinating thirty different national efforts while Russia is merely responsible for itself. Furthermore, in the Baltic states, Cordesman notes that the countries there have only token militaries and those forces have barely begun the process of becoming interoperable with NATO.
Overall, while the report notes that some European states have made strides in modernization and interoperability, there is still a great deal more that remains to be done. What Cordesman elucidates is that the U.S. needs to make clear its commitment to NATO and Europe; expand on the NATO 2030 Reflection Group’s work and develop clear individual national force plans; make its power projection capability available to European NATO allies and ensure that they know how each element benefits them; help NATO develop force plans that address the rapid advancement of technology; issue an unclassified annual report on U.S. power projection capabilities that describes the support the U.S. is providing in modern capabilities such as space and cyber, C4ISR, Joint All-Domain Operations, long-range precision strike systems, and missile defense, amongst others; and finally, to focus on the transatlantic need to compete with China and develop a collective approach to either persuade it to cooperate with the West or limit the risks of future conflicts by better addressing the China/Russia relationship.
Yet another piece that may have slipped under most people’s radars in the past few weeks is a great paper from the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Revival of Military Rule in South and Southeast Asia: Dangers to the Region’s Democratic Future,” by Joshua Kurlantzick. The report touches on the region’s overall democratic regression and the rise of illiberal leaders. The authors specifically note how regional states’ militaries have taken on increasing roles in various governments, with juntas in Myanmar and Thailand; and states like Cambodia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines seeing democratic erosion and their armed forces once again playing a major role in governance. The report notes how coups—which had declined in the period immediately after the end of the Cold War—have re-emerged, with coups in Thailand in 2006 and 2014 illustrative of the outbreak of military influence in civilian governance throughout the region.
However, Kurlantzick notes that despite partial or even full retreats from civilian politics after the Cold War, militaries in countries like Indonesia, Myanmar, and Thailand never saw their power clipped, or saw civilian command successfully enshrined. Furthermore, he notes that many of these countries failed to address human rights abuses committed by militaries during periods of junta rule, which fostered an overall climate of impunity. In addition, civilian leaders never took the steps needed to retrain militaries to accept civilian control, such as staffing military academies with outside instructors that could teach about robust civilian command of the military. Finally, Kurlantzick states that elected politicians failed to hand power from the military to civilian agencies which would have been easier to oversee, effectively creating the conditions for the military to resume power. In addition to this, the report argues that global powers’ ambivalent responses to coups suggests to future plotters that they will not be punished for their actions. Coupled with growing democratic disillusionment in the region, it creates the space for militaries to propose themselves as the answer to a country’s seemingly intractable problems.
However, Kurlantzick does offer a number of suggestions to prevent future coups and reduce military interference in civilian governance. These range from regional organizations such as ASEAN needing to take tougher approaches to coups in order to deter them; actions by global powers like the United States, France, Japan, and the European Union to condemn coups unequivocally through the application of sanctions, the backing of coup opponents with aid, taking steps to restore democracy at home, and working to convince China to help cooperate to prevent and reverse coups; and democrats in countries with the potential for couples to more publicly discuss past human rights by the army and to identify military officers who are amenable to civilian control of the military. If regional organizations, international partners, and democrats in each country do not take such steps, the proliferation of coups in the past decade may only be the tip of the iceberg.
Up next is a series of articles from the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), the International Crisis Group, and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), all of which look at how the U.S. should look to prevent and respond to coups. In, “Should ECOWAS Rethink its Approach to Coups,” FPRI’s Komlan Avoulete argues that more needs to be done to target and destabilize juntas that have taken over in West Africa in recent years. For instance, Avoulete argues that while sanctions may end up harming civilians in places like Mali, a failure by ECOWAS to institute any kind of economic punishment towards the military might cause the body to lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Ultimately, Avoulete states that sanctions need to be taken against any president that changes their country’s constitution to stay in power, but that the solution must be proportionate and target those instigating the military takeover, not the entire country.
In the Crisis Group commentary, “Why the UN Security Council Stumbles in Responding to Coups,” by Richard Gowan and Ashish Pradhan, the authors argue that the Council has never been adept at responding to coups, and that the body is often hindered in its response to coups due to confusion about what is happening on the ground; conflicting geopolitical interests among P5 members; and limited leverage over junta plotters. While the authors acknowledge that it is unlikely that the Security Council can do more to prevent coups due to these limitations, they do note that if and when Council members express concern about a coup, it may create the space for some actors like regional organizations such as ECOWAS or ASEAN to take more concrete actions, essentially giving them cover to act. Similarly, where there is momentum at regional organizations to condemn or address coups, member states can then use the United Nations to amplify those concerns, focusing attention on the issue and helping to uphold the eroding norm against military takeovers.
In closing, there are two interesting reports from late February from the USIP, the first being “Countering Coups: How to Prevent Armed Seizures of Power,” by Thomas P. Sheehy, Edward A. Burrier, Ena Dion, and Emily Cole, and the second, “Countering Coups: How to Help Rebuild Democratic Rule,” by Joseph Sany and Aly Verjee. In How to Prevent Armed Seizures of Power, the authors argue that there are three major ways that the U.S. can assist African countries avoid future coups. These suggestions start with the United States fully implementing the 2019 Global Fragility Act, specifically the requirement that the administration designate at least five priority countries, along with specific plans for coordinated U.S. action in each, to prevent violence and strengthen stability. Secondly, the authors argue that the U.S. needs to make better use of instruments for boosting the economies of fragile states in order to reduce the risk of coups. As mentioned above, rampant youth unemployment is a key driver of unrest, and the U.S. already has agencies, such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation which can inject investment into countries with economies that are starved for cash. Finally, Sheehy, Burrier, Dion, and Cole argue that the U.S., and other international donors, need to overhaul the provision of military and security assistance to fragile countries, working to strengthen their provision of governance and services, and not just their military capabilities. Here, the authors note that 58% of U.S. security assistance to the Sahel goes to train and equip projects and a majority of the rest goes to support international peacekeeping operations, with little focus put on building a culture of democratic, civilian governance that can be the basis for a positive future.
In How to Help Rebuild Democratic Rule, Sany and Verjee argue that when coups do occur, there is a need for the United States, and other democratic partners, to rectify a prior tendency to focus too narrowly on achieving as short as possible a transition, and instead focus on the quality of that transition, so that coups will not simply reemerge a few years down the line. As part of a successful transition, Sany and Verjee state that the U.S., and other international interlocutors, must create detailed roadmaps of the changes required to strengthen democracy in the country, including key goals and dates for their achievement. This way, democratic forces in-country can conduct their election campaigns based on the ways that they will assist the country in meeting the roadmap’s goals, rather than focusing on the often outsized personalities that are running for office, as often occurs. Furthermore, the authors argue that, in the transition to civilian governance, there needs to be a greater focus on including groups that had been previously excluded from power.
Finally, Sany and Verjee state that post-coup countries’ outside partners, as well as multilateral international organizations, need to use both carrots and sticks to press military rulers to leave power. They note that while these bodies may possess limited leverage to reverse coups, they do have the ability to provide the international respectability many coup plotters so desperately crave. When Myanmar’s Min Aung Hlaing was excluded from ASEAN’s leaders meetings in October 2021, it sent a message that at least some in the body will not tolerate military takeovers of duly-elected civilian governments. While Cambodia’s takeover of the may see that reversed, due to closer Cambodia-Myanmar ties, the public rebuke to the Burmese junta is a strong message and should be the minimum of what such international bodies will do to condemn coups.
Foreign Policy Reviews 